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Abstract: This paper studies implications of centralised wage setting for the
level of taxation and public expenditure in an analytical model with unionised
labour markets. We extend the previous studies by allowing for both demand and
supply effects of labour. Also, in addition to the standard social planner a p-
proach, we consider a political economy set up, where the tax rate is chosen to
maximise the welfare of a median voter. Our results suggest that when working
hours are endogenous, the relationship between the degree of centralisation and
the labour tax rate is ambiguous.  In particular, if the marginal utility from public
provision is sufficiently low, centralised wage setting implies lower optimal tax
rate on labour. This is due to a "budgetary discipline effect", which reduces the
optimal tax rate preferred by the median voter under centralised wage setting.
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Tiivistelmä: Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan keskitetyn palkanmuodostuksen vai-
kutusta verojen ja julkisten menojen määräytymiseen. Tarkastelukehikko on
ammattiliittomalli, jossa sekä työn kysyntä että työtuntien tarjonta määräytyvät
endogeenisesti. Veroasteen määräytyminen perustuu vaihtoehtoisesti joko ns.
suunnittelijan ongelman ratkaisuun tai mediaaniäänestäjän hyödyn maksimoin-
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riippuu olennaisesti työn tarjontaa, veron määräytymistä ja julkista hyödykettä
koskevista oletuksista.  Jos julkisen kulutuksen rajahyöty on alhainen, liittota-
solle hajautettu palkanmuodostus voi johtaa korkeampaan veroasteeseen. Tämä
on seurausta keskitetyn järjestelmän aiheuttamasta ”budjettikurivaikutuksesta”,
joka pyrkii alentamaan mediaaniäänestäjän preferoimaa veroastetta.
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A large body of political economy literature, ranging from basic median voter
models to the models of comparative politics and political constitutions, pro-
vides a variety of theoretical explanations to the observed country di¤erences
in the structure of public spending and taxation1. At the same time, much
less attention has been paid to the role of wage setting mechanism and labour
market institutions in explaining these di¤erences. This is somewhat surpris-
ing given the importance of labour taxes in …nancing the welfare spending
in today’s developed economies and the remarkable role of wage setting in-
stitutions in transmitting the e¤ects of labour taxation to employment and
e¢ciency.
This paper studies speci…cally whether the centralisation of wage setting
a¤ects the society’s prefered level of labour taxes. In closely related paper,
Summers, Gruger, and Vergara (1993) argue that centralised wage setting
causes the "social planner" to prefer higher tax rate on labour income when
compared to decentralised wage setting. The argument is based on the result
that centralised wage setting internalises the government’s budget constraint
and thus makes labour taxation less distorting with respect to labour demand
decisions 2. Exploiting the same principle, Kilponen and Sinko (2001) show
that the latter result also arises in a more realistic setup where both labour
supply and demand e¤ects are allowed for. In their model, labour supply is
endogenised through individual choice of working hours, the monopoly union
decides upon wages and the level of employment is determined by the pro…t
maximising …rms.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Kilponen and Sinko (2001) by
focusing on endogenous determination of the tax rate. The approach is novel
in that we allow for endogenous supply of working hours and compare the
results from the two alternative mechanisms of tax determination. In par-
ticular, we model the choice of optimal tax rate using two widely known
alternatives: In the …rst one, a benevolent social planner chooses the optimal
tax rate by maximising social welfare of the economy. In the second one, the
optimal tax rate is decided by the median voter.
It turns out that the assumptions on labour supply and determination of
taxes are decisive for the model’s predictions on the preferred level of wage
taxation. When the tax rate is chosen by the social planner and labour supply
1See for instance Persson and Tabellini (1999) for a review.
2This prediction has found support in a number of empirical studies suggesting that
adverse employment e¤ects of labour taxation are smaller in countries with centralised
wage setting (Elmeskov (1998), Daveri & Tabellini, (2000), Kiander, Kilponen & Vilmunen
(2000), Everaert & Heylen (2002)).
1is exogenously …xed, the optimal tax rate is unambiguously higher in the
centralised case in accordance with Summers et al (1993). This holds subject
to some minor quali…cations even if unemployment bene…ts are …nanced with
tax revenues and labour supply decision by individual workers is allowed for.
In the median voter regime with endogenous labour supply, the relation-
ship between the degree of centralisation in the wage setting and the optimal
tax rate on wages is generally ambiguous. In fact, it is perfectly plausible
that the median voter prefers a lower tax rate when wage setting is cen-
tralised. This result seems to be in line with the recent stylised facts on wage
bargaining institutions and public …nance: The average e¤ective labour tax
rate and public consumption in the countries with industry level wage bar-
gaining structure have been somewhat higher when compared to countries
with centralised wage setting during the last three decades.3
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 analyses the decision of optimal tax rate and section 4 concludes.
3For further discussion and empirical evidence, see Kiander et al (2000).
22 The Model Preliminaries
In this section, we brie‡y introduce the model equations that are utilised
in section 3 to discuss the determination of optimal tax rate and the level
of public spending4. We start by considering the following broad model of
labour markets: Individuals choose working hours h taking the wage w as
given; …rms choose employment N taking wages and working hours as given;
and, a monopoly union sets wages allowing for the response of both workers
and …rms.5 Within this framework, the equilibrium wages, working hours
and employment are sensitive to a number of assumptions that can be made
on institutional structure of the economy, such as determination of taxes,
unemployment bene…ts, other public expenditure and, not least, the degree
of centralisation in the wage setting.
In the present set up, the question of the degree of centralisation boils
down to the question of whether the monopolistic unions recognise the con-
nection between wages and government budget.6 If the unions operate mainly
at industry level and there is no co-operation among the unions of di¤erent
industries, it maybe plausible to assume that the unions treat the provi-
sion of public good as given. This is likely to characterize most of the ad-
vanced economies, except US, Canada and Great Britain, where a majority
of workers are covered by industry level agreements (Wallerstein and West-
ern, 2000). On the contrary, in some countries centralised wage contracts
extend to several industrial sectors and cover almost entire private sector.
In such countries7, it is reasonable to assume that unions ”see beyond the
budget constraint of the government” and thus take account of the e¤ects
of wages on public …nances, in particular on the provision of public good.
This is particularly plausible if the government is either implicitly or ex-
plicitly involved in the wage setting process through the so called tri-partite
co-operation. In tripartite co-operation government typically provides in-
centives for wage moderation using tax and social policy instruments (See
e.g. Vartiainen (1998)). In what follows, we refer to these two institutional
setups as decentralised and centralised case, respectively.
4A more detailed derivation of the equations can be found in Kilponen & Sinko (2001)
5Holm, Kiander and Koskela (1995) use similar framework to analyse the e¤ects of tax
structure in the decentralised union case.
6For an alternative approach where a centralised union takes into account the link
between wages and general price level see e.g. Dri¢ll & van der Ploeg (1993).
7The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are examples of economies where
such centralised contracts have been used for substantial periods of time (See for instance,
Checci et al (2002), Golden (2002) and Wallerstein and Western (2000)).
32.1 Firm behaviour
The level of employment is determined by the competitive pro…t maximising
…rms, that solves the following problem
max
N
¦=f (Nh) ¡ whN (2.1)
For analytical simplicity, we assume that workers and hours are perfect sub-
stitutes in production so that our production function takes the form
f (Nh)=( Nh)
° , °<1 (2.2)
Under this assumption, the …rst order condition for pro…t maximisation








which is the demand for labour with Nw < 0;N h < 0. Firms are not rationed














is the elasticity of employment with respect to working hours.
2.2 Individual behaviour and labour supply
As for the individuals, we normalise their total number to unity, out of which
N are employed and 1 ¡ N are unemployed. The utility of employed indi-
viduals is evaluated by quasi-linear utility function
Ue = ye ¡ v(h)+z(G) (2.6)
where ye denotes after tax income (to be de…ned below) and v(h) is some
convex function denoting disutility from work with vh > 0;v hh > 0;v(0) = 0
and v(1) < 1. We normalise total time endowment to unity, thereby (1 ¡ h)
is the time spent on other non-productive activities, such as leisure. z(G) is
a function, denoting utility from the publicly provided good, G. Throughout
the paper we assume that public good has a constant positive marginal utility
4less than one 0 <z G < 1: The assumption that the marginal utility of public
good is less than unity implies that the marginal utility of private income
is always higher than that of public good for the individual. The utility of
unemployed individuals is given by
Uu = yu + z(G) (2.7)
Net labour incomes for employed (ye) and unemployed (yu) are de…ned as
ye = wh(1 ¡ ¿)
yu = wu (2.8)
where w is the wage set by the union, wu is an exogenous unemployment
bene…t net of taxes and h is hours worked. Finally, ¿ is the proportional tax
rate on wages. For later use we note that the utility di¤erence between the
employed and unemployed can be expressed as
Ue ¡ Uu = wh(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ wu ¡ v(h) (2.9)
We assume throughout the paper that Ue ¡ Uu is positive i.e. employed are
better o¤ than the unemployed and unemployment is thus involuntary. Once





ye = wh(1 ¡ ¿)
This yields the …rst order condition
(1 ¡ ¿)w ¡ v
0(h)=0 (2.11)







h = ((1 ¡ ¿)w)
1
±¡1 (2.13)
Under this formulation the (uncompensated) own price elasticity of labour









Notice that our model encompasses the model with …xed working hours when
± !1 : At this point, individual workers disutility from labour approaches
zero and workers would supply …xed (h =1 )amount of labour as implied by
(2.12) and (2.13).
2.3 Government budget
We assume that the government collects taxes on wages at rate ¿.T a x
revenues are then used to …nance costs of the unemployment bene…ts wu
and a publicly provided good, G.8 Consequently, the government budget
constraint takes the following simple form
¿whN = G + wu(1 ¡ N) (2.15)
where w;h and N are wages, hours worked and employment as de…ned above.
For simplicity, we do not allow the government to balance its budget by
debt. With …xed unemployment bene…t per capita, the level of public good
is endogenous and adjusts to satisfy the budget constraint.
2.4 Labour market equilibrium
Traditionally, in similar models wages are set by a decentralised utilitarian
monopoly union, which is small enough not to take into account the conse-
quences of their wage policy on aggregate economy. The unions have been
granted a right to negotiate the wages of their members but not hours. They
act as Stackelberg leaders, setting the wage of their members and letting the
…rms and individuals decide over employment and hours, respectively. This
implies that union considers the provision of public good as given.








8We abstract from the e¤ects on labour market of the production of G: Therefore, G
can be interpreted as income transfers not related to labour market status.
6The …rst order condition is
dV
dw







Expressing the …rst order condition conveniently in the elasticity form,
applying the envelope theorem, using the total elasticity of labour demand
with respect to wage (² ´ ²d + ²s), and …nally solving for the wage at given












Equation (2.18) decomposes the wage rate to that prevailing in the con-
ventional monopoly union model with zero disutility of labour and inelastic
labour supply (h =1 ;v (1) = 0), and an additional term allowing for the
disutility of labour. With total elasticity of labour demand with respect to
wage greater than one (²>1), the additional term is positive i.e. the wage
rate is higher if the disutility of labour is allowed for. The monopoly union
wage is, in other words, a mark up over the reservation wage of its members.
The size of the mark up, determined by the …rst term in the right hand side
of (2.18), depends on the elasticity of labour demand, but also on tax rate.
With an endogenous labour supply the reservation wage, captured by the
term within square brackets, consists of unemployment bene…t paid per hour
and the value of lost leisure gross of tax.
Given the decision rules for wages (2.18), hours supplied (2.13) and em-
ployment (2.3) the labour market equilibrium can be written as
w


















w h e r ew eh a v eu s e da na s s u m p t i o nt h a tv(h)=1
±h± and where
ye ´ wh(1 ¡ ¿)=
wu
1 ¡ 1=± ¡ 1=²
(2.22)
is the after tax earnings of an employed worker. Noticing from (2.22) that










In the face of tax change, optimal response of the monopoly union is to
keep the after tax wage constant (2.19). Thus, there is a complete after tax
wage resistance, or in other words, tax changes are completely borne by the
employer. This is the conventional result of the monopoly union model (e.g.
Holmlund et al (1989)). Since the after tax wage determines supply of hours,
the latter is una¤ected by changes in taxes in equilibrium.
2.5 Centralised Union
The previous case of decentralised wage setting characterises the labour mar-
ket situation where wage setting takes place at industry level, without explicit
or even de facto co-ordination among the unions. In this section, we turn to
the alternative case, where an exclusive control over wages has been granted
to confederation of unions or wage setting is well co-ordinated across indus-
trial sectors. As already discussed above, in such a setup it is reasonable to
assume that unions ”see beyond the budget constraint of the government”
and thus take account of the e¤ects of wages on public …nances, in particular
on the provision of public good.9
Formally, the union’s problem can be expressed as
max
w






Following a similar procedure as in the decentralised union case, but inter-
nalising the e¤ect of wages on the provision of public good and di¤erentiating
the government’s budget constraint, it is possible to derive the equations cor-
responding to (2.19)-(2.21) for the centralised case as follows
9Calmfors and Dri¢ll (1988) argue that labour demand elasticity is likely to change
when wage setting becomes more centralised. Since our focus is on the wage formation
mechanism as such, we assume that the external conditions are invariable.
8w
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where net labour income yec now is
yec ´ wchc(1 ¡ ¿)=
Ã
wu (1 ¡ zG)







Notably, (2.30) collapses into gross labour income in the decentralised union
case (2.22) when zG =0 : It is immediately clear that with 0 <z G < 1
yec <y e (2.31)
In other words, the after tax income is lower in the centralised union case10.
It is indeed easy to show that wc in (2.27) is decreasing in zG: This represents
a wage moderation e¤ect of public good. The centralised union realises that
higher wages and the consequent drop in employment imply a lower supply of
public good. The wage moderation e¤ect is larger, the higher is the marginal
utility from public good.
With the notation adopted above, the levels of wages, hours, and employ-
ment in the decentralised and centralised case can be conveniently compared
by evaluating the net labour incomes, ye and yec, in the two cases. It imme-
diately follows from (2.31) that the gross wage and the individual workers’
labour supply will be lower while the level of employment will be higher in the
centralised case when compared to decentralised case i.e. w¤
c <w ¤;h ¤
c <h ¤
and N¤
c >N ¤. Moreover, the after tax income (2.30) now depends negatively














10For a formal proof see Kilponen and Sinko (2001), Appendix B)
9Noteworthy, the supply of hours now depends negatively on the tax rate.
As suggested by Kilponen and Sinko (2001), this is due to the fact that the
centralised union does not fully compensate the tax increase by higher wages
and therefore supply of labour by individuals drops. This e¤ect is essential
for some of the results derived in the next section.
103 Endogenous tax rate
In the previous section, we have followed the model of Kilponen and Sinko
(2001) and suggested that more centralised bargaining leads into lower wages
and higher employment at a given level of taxes. In this section, we analyse
the determination of labour tax rate within the model. In particular, we ask
whether the degree of centralisation in the labour market a¤ects the preferred
level of taxation and public spending in the economy.
Generally, the government’s problem may be expressed as one of choosing
the optimal level of taxation when the tax revenue is used to …nance the
provision of some public goods. The speci…ed model then implies a mapping
from tax rate to tax revenue and the level of public provision. Since the
tax is distortionary, individuals (and unions) tend to change their behaviour
t oa v o i dt a xp a y m e n t s . E v e n t u a l l y ,a th i g he n o u g ht a xr a t e ,s a y¿L,t h i s
reaction becomes so strong that further increases in the tax rate will reduce
the revenue and consequently, the amount of publicly provided goods.11
Extending this argument, it seems natural to assume that the public pro-
vision of goods and services is …nanced as a residual after the mandatory
expenditure such as the unemployment bene…ts (see e.g. Sinko, 1999). In
such set up, lower employment has two separate e¤ects on the public pro-
vision: On the one hand, tax revenues are reduced. On the other hand,
unemployment expenditures are increased. Both of the e¤ects tend to nar-
row government’s possibilities to provide other transfers, goods and services.
One would expect that the public provision of these starts falling at a tax
rate lower than the one which maximises tax revenue. This can indeed be
demonstrated within our model, too.
In what follows we refer to the mapping from the tax rate ¿ to the public
provision G as the net La¤er curve, which reaches the peak at some tax rate
¿G <¿ L: It seems reasonable to conjecture that the optimal tax rate in the
model cannot exceed ¿G and thus must lie in the interval [0;¿G].12 For rates
lower than ¿G; the government must balance the gains in terms of higher
provision of public good against the losses in private welfare caused by the
increased tax distortion.
The optimal choice of the labour tax rate then crucially depends upon the
way the most preferred tax rate is chosen. The traditional choice is a view
point of an all-encompassing social planner, that aims to maximise social
welfare. However, this is not necessarily the only relevant alternative. It
11The hump-shaped relation between tax rate and revenue is known as "La¤er curve"
according to Professor Arthur La¤er.
12With endogenous working hours, there might exist a special case where it would be
optimal to choose ¿¤ >¿ G; provided that labour supply e¤ect was strong enough.
11might be reasonable to assume that the government objective would be to
maximise the welfare of a “median voter”, which is a common approach in
the political economy literature. In what follows we develop both approaches,
starting from the social planner case.
3.1 Social planner approach
In the framework of this paper, consider an all encompassing social planner,
who maximises the social welfare of the economy (S). Social welfare consists
of total output minus the disutility of labour devoted in its production, and
any additional welfare due to the provision of public good. Formally,
S = f(N;h) ¡ Nv(h)+( PzG ¡ 1)G (3.1)
where introduction of parameter P allows social marginal valuation of public
good to di¤er from that of private. In particular, we are interested in the
case P>1; where social valuation of public provison exceeds its private
valuation. Such a situation is likely to arise if the publicly provided good
creates positive externalities or bears features of the so called merit goods.













According to this, taxation has two separate e¤ects on welfare. First, taxa-
tion a¤ects the level of total output and hours worked, re‡ected by the …rst
two terms in the right hand side of (3.2). Second, taxation determines the
share of total output devoted to provision of public good. This in turn a¤ects
welfare to the extent that marginal valuation of public provision di¤ers from
that of private consumption, PzG 6=1 : This e¤ect is captured by the last
term in the right hand side of (3.2).
For simplicity, consider …rst the case where supply of hours is exogenously
…xed and unemployment bene…ts are …nanced from external sources. 13With
these simplifying assumptions, we are able to solve the …rst order condition
analytically. Setting the right hand of (3.2) equal to zero, the …rst order
condition for the optimal tax rate is
@f
@¿




13The case of …xed working hours can be easily derived as a special case by letting
± !1in the model’s equations. Then h =1and v(h)=0 : Assuming that unemployment




@¿ · 0; assuming PzG > 1 ensures that @G
@¿ ¸ 0 i.e. that
net La¤er curve is not downward sloping. Substituting for the corresponding
variables from previous sections, we can derive (see Appendix A1 for details)




PzG (1 ¡ °)+° ¡ 2
Pz G ¡ 1
(3.4)
which is positive if Pz G >
2¡°
1¡°: Similarly (see Appendix A1), we can derive




2 ¡ zG (1 + P (1 ¡ °)) ¡ °
(1 ¡ zG)(1¡ PzG)
(3.5)
which is positive if PzG >
2¡(zG+°)
1¡° : This implies that lower social valuation
of the public good is needed to make the social planner’s utility maximising
tax rate positive in the centralised case. Finally, with the above formulas
it is straightforward to derive the di¤erence between the tax rate in the






zG (1 ¡ °)
1 ¡ zG
> 0 (3.6)
Thus the optimal tax rate in the centralised case is unambiguously higher
for the given parameters. This di¤erence is increasing in private marginal
valuation of public good zG; and as expected, when zG =0the di¤erence
disappears. The following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1 If the supply of hours is …xed and unemployment bene…t is
…nanced from external resources, the optimal tax rate chosen by the social
planner is higher under centralised wage setting (¿¤
c >¿ ¤
d).
The result stated in proposition (1) in fact corresponds to the …ndings
of Summers et al. (1993). As we add more realism to the model and let
the unemployment bene…ts be …nanced from the tax revenue as well as allow
endogenous working hours, derivations become more complicated. By relax-
ing the assumption of external …nancing of bene…ts, we can show that the
prerequisite for a positive tax rate to emerge in centralised or decentralised
case is that labour demand is not too elastic (see Appendix A2). Intuitively,
if labour demand is very elastic, higher tax rate causes such a strong increase
in unemployment spending that no positive tax rate can be optimal. Exclud-
ing this case, we can derive the following formula for the di¤erence of the







(1 ¡ °)(1¡ zG)
(3.7)
13which is positive for all 0 <°<0:5. Condition °<0:5 implies labour
demand elasticity being less than two, ²d < 2; which is also a necessary
condition for positive optimal tax rates to emerge. Consequently, provided
that labour demand is not too elastic, proposition (1) still holds. If labour
demand elasticity is very high, implying °>0:5; then zero (or negative) tax
rates would be optimal.
Finally, let us consider the general formulation with working hours de-
termined by individual supply as de…ned in (2.13). In the centralised case,
introduction of endogenous hours tends to reduce the welfare loss implied by
a higher tax rate and therefore, ceteris paribus, increases the optimal tax rate
chosen by the social planner. However, in the decentralised case, the equi-
librium supply of hours is invariant to changes in the tax rate as can be seen
from (2.24) and the optimal tax rate ¿¤
d is not a¤ected by the introduction
of endogenous hours. Combining these notions, the gap between optimal tax
rates in the two cases is a priori likely to be increased.
Since …nding an analytical solution for the general formulation proved
cumbersome, we had to rely on numerical simulations. It turned out that the
relationship between the optimal tax rates in the two case critically depends
on the elasticity of labour supply as well as the di¤erence between social
and private valuation of public good. Nevertheless, resticting the analysis
to positive tax rates, decentralised wage setting leads into lower taxation
than centralised one. Consequently, the proposition (1) holds even when
labour supply is endogenous and unemployment bene…ts are …nanced from
tax revenues and thus the result of Summers et al (1993) carries over to the
present set up.
3.2 The “median voter” approach
In the previous section we assumed that taxes were determined to maximise
the social welfare. Perhaps more realistically, we next study the determi-
nation of taxes and public good in the political economy set up, where the
taxes are set to satisfy the median voter. For reasonable unemployment rates
then, the optimal labour tax rate will be determined by an employed worker.
Formally, recall …rst that the utility of an employed worker is
Ue = wh(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ v (h)+z (G) (3.8)
14where ye = wh(1 ¡¿)14. Totally di¤erentiating (3.8) and using the fact that










Notice that employment does not enter expression (3.9). This is due to
the fact that an employed individual does not care about increased unemploy-
ment as long as his/her own job is secured. The only possible cost implied
by higher taxation is the reduction in the take home pay, ye: Optimal tax
rate is set equal to the level at which private utility from marginal increase
in public expenditure equals marginal loss in take-home-pay and marginal
change in the value of leisure. The latter is due to endogenous labour supply.
Notice, however, that in the decentralised case the union keeps after tax
wage constant i.e.
@ye
@¿ =0 . Therefore, the median voter’s preferred tax rate
in the decentralised case will be the one that maximises the public provision,
as can be seen from (3.9).
In the centralised case
@ye
@¿ < 0 and higher taxes are re‡ected in a lower
take home pay among the employed (since the union wage policy does not
fully compensate the loss due to higher taxes). This brings about a “bud-
getary discipline e¤ect” among employed workers, who are no longer willing
to increase taxation to the level where public good provision is maximised.
Consequently, we cannot say ap r i o r iwhether the optimal tax rate for the
median voter is higher or lower in the centralised case in comparison to the
decentralised case.
Moreover, the most general case with endogenous working hours and un-
employment bene…ts …nanced from the tax revenues proves cumbersome to be
solved analytically. We therefore start with the most simple case where hours
are …xed and unemployment bene…ts are …nanced from external sources. In
this case, appendix A.3 shows that the optimal tax rate in the centralised
and decentralised cases respectively reads as
¿
¤







Proposition 2 When hours are …xed and unemployment bene…ts are …-
nanced from external sources, the median voter prefers higher tax rate under
centralised wage setting (¿¤
cm >¿ ¤
dm).
14Noteworthy, we follow the standard convention of trade union models that workers
receive no capital income. The pro…ts accrue to capital owners that do not supply working
hours.
15In other words, the principle stated in proposition (1) holds true also in
the median voter case. Furthermore, from (3.11) we notice that the di¤erence
between optimal tax rates in the two cases is increasing in zG. Utility gain
from marginal increase in the public provision is proportional to its private
marginal valuation. The centralised union takes this into account in its wage
policy and thus the median voter’s preferred tax rate will be increasing in
the private marginal valuation of public provision, zG.
In order to analyse the most general case with endogenous working hours
and unemployment bene…ts …nanced with tax revenues, we rely on numerical
simulations. We start with the benchmark where the uncompensated labour
supply elasticity is ²s = :25; and wage elasticity of employment for …xed
hours is ²d =1 :7. The unemployment bene…t wu is set equal to 0:115.
¿¤ G=Y
Decentralised 40:11 5 :4
Centralised 44:01 6 :0
Table 1: Baseline simulations
Table 1 summarises the main results from the baseline simulations, where
we have set zG = :57. With this value of marginal utility of public good,
we …nd out that optimal tax rate preferred by the employed worker in the
centralized case would be around 4 percentage points higher than that in the
decentralised case. In this simulation, the labour demand e¤ect dominates
the supply e¤ect and due to low wage rate, the economy with centralised wage
setting exhibits both higher employment and total production. Moreover,
optimal tax rate and the public provision per total output is clearly higher
in the centralised case.
Given that median voter preferred tax rate will be determined solely by
the net La¤er curve in the decentralised case, it is of some interest to plot
this curve for alternative values of labour supply elasticity. Figure (1) draws
the net La¤er curves in the decentralised case with tax rate on the horizontal
axis and public provision in excess of unemployment bene…ts on the vertical
axis. The curves have the familiar inverted U-shape form. The preferred
15Although the rate of unemployment does not a¤ect the optimal level of taxation
in our model, it does a¤ect the public good provided through the government’s budget
constraint. We have therefore calibrated the model such that at each given optimal tax
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Figure 1: The net La¤er curves under elastic and inelastic labour supply in
the decentralised case.
tax rate in the median voter case can be read on the horizontal axis directly
beneath the stationary point of the curves. The …gure reveals that more
elastic labour supply makes the median voter prefer higher tax rate. When
labour supply is very elastic (²s =0 :33), the median voter preferred tax rate
would be ¿1 =0 :43; while with practically …xed working hours, the preferred
tax rate would be at ¿2 =0 :28.
Net La¤er curves in the centralised case have a similar inverted U-shape,
but as can be seen from (3.9), the median voter does not choose the tax rate
so as to maximise the public provision. We therefore need to rely on more
s p e c i … cs i m u l a t i o n si nt h i sc a s e .
In table 2, we simulate the centralised case for three alternative values of
labour supply elasticity and for a range of values of private marginal valuation
of public provision.
Recalling that the tax rates preferred by the median voter with inelastic,
- semi-elastic and elastic labour supply are given by 0:28; 0:41 and 0:43
respectively, we see that in each case, it is possible that the median voter
would actually prefer a lower tax rate in the centralised wage bargaining
situation. The table also reveals that depending upon the private marginal
valuation of public good, more elastic labour supply may either decrease or
increase the tax rate preferred by the median voter in the centralised case.











0:10 :05 0:01 0
0:30 :10 :04 0:02
0:50 :22 0:35 0:30
0:70 :64 0:61 0:62
0:90 :84 0:63 0:65
¿¤
d 0:28 0:41 0:43
Table 2: Optimal tax rate preferred by the median voter with alternative
values of labour supply elasticity (²s) and marginal valuation of public good
(zG).
elastic labour supply monotonically increases the tax rate preferred by the
median voter. Consequently, the more elastic labour supply, the less likely
it is that the median voter would prefer higher tax rate in the centralised
wage bargaining case when compared to decentralised one. In particular, the
combination of relatively low private marginal valuation of public provision
and elastic labour supply, is likely to lead to higher optimal tax rates in
the decentralised case. These …ndings can be summarised by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 When working hours are determined by individual supply,
labour supply elasticity is high and private valuation of public goods is low,
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If the unions are large enough to recognize a linkage between taxes and ben-
e…ts received, they internalise the government’s budget constraint in their
wage policy and hence bear the cost of a wage hike in terms of reduced
public provision of goods and services. This leads into more moderate wage
responses to labor taxes and higher employment at a given level of taxa-
tion. Moreover, tax rates and the institutional setting of wage bargaining
are likely to be inter-dependent. The seminal analysis by Summers et al.
(1993) suggest that centralised wage setting is likely to encourage the provi-
sion of public goods and the use of labour taxes for …nancing public outlays.
The authors then conjecture, that countries with centralised wage setting are
likely to post higher tax rates on labour.
In this paper, we have extended this discussion into two directions. First,
we have relaxed the assumption on exogenous labour supply and studied the
decision on optimal labour tax rate in the model which allows both labour
demand and supply e¤ects. Second, in addition to traditional social planner
approach, we have considered the determination of taxes in the political
economy set up, where the tax rate is chosen to maximise the welfare of the
median voter.
It turned out that endogenous labour supply and assumptions concerning
the determination of tax rates are decisive for the model’s predictions on the
preferred level of labour taxation. The results derived under …xed labour
supply and social planner regime do not necessarily carry over to more real-
istic set ups. In particular, our model suggests that under the median voter
regime, the relationship between the degree of centralisation of wage bar-
gaining and the optimal tax rate is ambiguous. Furthermore, it is perfectly
plausible that the median voter prefers a lower tax rate when wage setting
is centralised. This is due to the ”budgetary discipline” e¤ect that arises if
wage setting is centralised: wage response to higher taxes is incomplete so
that net labour income of median voter declines. This causes median voter to
prefer a lower tax rate. This prediction of higher optimal tax rate in the case
of decentralised wage setting seems to be in line with the stylised facts on
wage bargaining institutions and public …nance presented in Kiander et al.
(2000). The average e¤ective labour tax rate and public consumption in the
countries with industry level wage bargaining structure have been somewhat
higher when compared to countries with centralised wage setting institutions
during the last three decades.
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21A Derivations of optimal tax rates
A.1 Social planner
First consider the social welfare function in the case of exogenous working
hours
S = f +( PzG ¡ 1)G (A.1)
with ue-bene…ts …nanced from external resources, the formula for the public
good derived from (2.15) simpli…es to
G = ¿wN
= ¿°f (A.2)
where the second equality follows from utilising the …rst order condition
of pro…t maximisation (2.3) and conveniently expresses the share of total
production devoted to provision of the public good. Substituting into (A.1)
and di¤erentiating with respect to the tax rate yields the following …rst order





1+( zGP ¡ 1)°¿
(A.3)
The left hand side can be developed to a more useful form by utililising
the de…nition of the production function (2.2) implying f = N° and f¿ =
°N°¡1 (@N=@¿): Substituting this for
f¿
f and rearranging yields the following







1+( zGP ¡ 1)°¿
(A.4)
where the left hand side is the elasticity of equilibrium employment with
respect to the tax rate and depends on the degree of centralisation in the







(1 ¡ ¿)(1¡ °)
(A.5)
Substituting (A.5) into (A.4) and solving for ¿ then yields the optimal tax




zGP (1 ¡ °)+° ¡ 2
zGP ¡ 1
22As for the centralised case the elasticity formula is somewhat more compli-










¿ (1 ¡ zG) ¡ 1
¶
(A.6)
Again, substituting above into (A.4) and solving for ¿ yields the optimal




2 ¡ zG (1 + P (1 ¡ °)) ¡ °
(1 ¡ zG)(1¡ zGP)
A.2 Derivation of result (45)




2 ¡ zG(P +1 )¡ 2° (1 ¡ zGP)





zGP (2° ¡ 1) + 2(1 ¡ °)
(1 ¡ °)(1¡ zGP)
(A.8)
Set ¿¤














zG (P ¡ 1)
(1 ¡ zG)(zGP ¡ 1)(° ¡ 1)
2 < 0 (A.10)




zG(P +1 )¡ 2
zG2P ¡ 2
´ °cc (A.11)





















i.e. optimal tax rate in the centarlised case is decreasing in °: Therefore, for
a positive tax rate to emerge we must have
°<
Pz G ¡ 2
2Pz G ¡ 2






Thus, for positive tax rates to emerge in both decentralised and centralised
case we must have
°<° cd (A.15)






which is su¢cient for both °cd and °cc being positive i.e. that there exist
0 <°<1 such that ¿¤













































@¿ =0in the decentralised case. This implies that the me-
dian voter preferred tax rate will be implicitly determined by the condition
24@G
@¿ =0 : Utilising the …rst order condition of pro…t maximisation and rewrit-
ing the government’s budget constraint as G = ¿°f when unemployment





°f + ¿°f¿ =0 (A.21)
Furthermore, recall that f = N° and f¿ = °f=N(@N
@¿ ); when hours are …xed.












N = ¡ ¿
(1¡¿)(1¡°) in (A.22) and solving for ¿; we …nd that
¿
¤
dm =1¡ ° (A.23)
which is the optimal tax rate preferred by the median voter with exogenous
labour supply and unemployment bene…ts …nanced from external sources in
the decentralised case.
In the centralised case with exogenous working hours, we utilise the …rst
order condition of the workers, which states that (1 ¡ ¿)w = v0(1) = 1:
Consequently, when working hours are …xed the optimal tax rate preferred
by the median voter will be implicitly determined by the condition @G
@¿ =0
also in the centralised case. When unemployment bene…ts are …nanced from
external sources, the condition (A.22) still holds with the di¤erence that in

















which is the optimal tax rate preferred by the median voter in the centralised
case with …xed working hours and unemployment bene…ts …nanced from ex-
ternal sources.
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